Abstract
On December 3 1984, more than 40 tons
of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India,
immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant morbidity and
premature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what became
the worst industrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself
from legal responsibility. Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian
Government through mediation of that country's Supreme Court and accepted moral
responsibility. It paid $470 million in compensation, a relatively small amount
of based on significant underestimations of the long-term health consequences
of exposure and the number of people exposed. The disaster indicated a need for
enforceable international standards for environmental safety, preventative
strategies to avoid similar accidents and industrial disaster preparedness.
Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid
industrialization. While some positive changes in government policy and
behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to the environment
from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread
environmental degradation with significant adverse human health consequences
continues to occur throughout India.
December
2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of the massive toxic gas leak from Union
Carbide Corporation's chemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh,
India that killed more than 3,800 people. This review examines the health
effects of exposure to the disaster, the legal response, the lessons learned
and whether or not these are put into practice in India in terms of industrial
development, environmental management and public health.
History
In the 1970s, the Indian government initiated policies
to encourage foreign companies to invest in local industry. Union Carbide
Corporation (UCC) was asked to build a plant for the manufacture of Sevin, a
pesticide commonly used throughout Asia. As part of the deal, India's
government insisted that a significant percentage of the investment come from
local shareholders. The government itself had a 22% stake in the company's
subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) . The company built the plant in
Bhopal because of its central location and access to transport infrastructure.
The specific site within the city was zoned for light industrial and commercial
use, not for hazardous industry. The plant was initially approved only for
formulation of pesticides from component chemicals, such as MIC imported from
the parent company, in relatively small quantities. However, pressure from
competition in the chemical industry led UCIL to implement "backward
integration" – the manufacture of raw materials and intermediate products
for formulation of the final product within one facility. This was inherently a
more sophisticated and hazardous process.
In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one quarter
of its production capacity due to decreased demand for pesticides. Widespread
crop failures and famine on the subcontinent in the 1980s led to increased
indebtedness and decreased capital for farmers to invest in pesticides. Local
managers were directed to close the plant and prepare it for sale in July 1984
due to decreased profitability .
When no ready buyer was found, UCIL made plans to dismantle key production
units of the facility for shipment to another developing country. In the
meantime, the facility continued to operate with safety equipment and procedures
far below the standards found in its sister plant in Institute, West Virginia.
The local government was aware of safety problems but was reticent to place
heavy industrial safety and pollution control burdens on the struggling
industry because it feared the economic effects of the loss of such a large
employer.
At 11.00 PM on December 2 1984, while most of the one
million residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant noticed a small
leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and increasing pressure inside a storage
tank. The vent-gas scrubber, a safety device designer to neutralize toxic
discharge from the MIC system, had been turned off three weeks prior.
Apparently a faulty valve had allowed one ton of water for cleaning internal
pipes to mix with forty tons of MIC .
A 30 ton refrigeration unit that normally served as a safety component to cool
the MIC storage tank had been drained of its coolant for use in another part of
the plant .
Pressure and heat from the vigorous exothermic reaction in the tank continued
to build. The gas flare safety system was out of action and had been for three
months. At around 1.00 AM, December 3, loud rumbling reverberated around the
plant as a safety valve gave way sending a plume of MIC gas into the early morning
air .
Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered with human corpses and the
carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs and birds. An estimated 3,800 people died
immediately, mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the UCC plant .
Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with the injured, a crisis further
compounded by a lack of knowledge of exactly what gas was involved and what its
effects were .
It became one of the worst chemical disasters in history and the name Bhopal
became synonymous with industrial catastrophe .
Estimates of the number of people killed in the first
few days by the plume from the UCC plant run as high as 10,000, with 15,000 to
20,000 premature deaths reportedly occurring in the subsequent two decades .
The Indian government reported that more than half a million people were
exposed to the gas .
Several epidemiological studies conducted soon after the accident showed
significant morbidity and increased mortality in the exposed population. Table 1. summarizes early and late effects on
health. These data are likely to under-represent the true extent of adverse
health effects because many exposed individuals left Bhopal immediately
following the disaster never to return and were therefore lost to follow-up
Aftermath
Immediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts to
dissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Its principal tactic
was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating the plant was wholly built and
operated by the Indian subsidiary. It also fabricated scenarios involving
sabotage by previously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntled employees
but this theory was impugned by numerous independent sources.
The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7,
the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an American attorney in a
U.S. court. This was the beginning of years of legal machinations in which the
ethical implications of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal's people were
largely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas
Leak Disaster Act as a way of ensuring that claims arising from the accident
would be dealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the government the
sole representative of the victims in legal proceedings both within and outside
India. Eventually all cases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the
ruling of the presiding American judge and placed entirely under Indian
jurisdiction much to the detriment of the injured parties.
In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court,
UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay $470 million to the Indian
government to be distributed to claimants as a full and final settlement. The
figure was partly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 people died and
102,000 suffered permanent disabilities .
Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2 per share or 7% in value.
Had compensation in Bhopal been paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims
where being awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC – which mined
asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liability would have been greater than the $10
billion the company was worth and insured for in 1984 .
By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and
Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for
injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to
families of the dead was $2,200.
At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate,
obfuscate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of victims. Even to
this date, the company has not stated exactly what was in the toxic cloud that
enveloped the city on that December night .
When MIC is exposed to 200° heat, it forms degraded MIC that contains the more
deadly hydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence that the storage tank
temperature did reach this level in the disaster. The cherry-red color of blood
and viscera of some victims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning .
Moreover, many responded well to administration of sodium thiosulfate, an
effective therapy for cyanide poisoning but not MIC exposure .
UCC initially recommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew the statement
later prompting suggestions that it attempted to cover up evidence of HCN in
the gas leak. The presence of HCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point
of conjecture among researchers .
As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its
Bhopal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up the industrial site
completely. The plant continues to leak several toxic chemicals and heavy
metals that have found their way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminated
water has now been added to the legacy left by the company for the people of
Bhopal.
Lessons learned
The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding
industrialization in developing countries without concurrent evolution in
safety regulations could have catastrophic consequences .
The disaster demonstrated that seemingly local problems of industrial hazards
and toxic contamination are often tied to global market dynamics. UCC's Sevin
production plant was built in Madhya Pradesh not to avoid environmental
regulations in the U.S. but to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticide
market. However the manner in which the project was executed suggests the
existence of a double standard for multinational corporations operating in
developing countries.
Enforceable uniform international operating regulations for hazardous
industries would have provided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety
in Bhopal. Even without enforcement, international standards could provide
norms for measuring performance of individual companies engaged in hazardous
activities such as the manufacture of pesticides and other toxic chemicals in
India .
National governments and international agencies should focus on widely
applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident prevention as
much in the developing world context as in advanced industrial nations .
Specifically, prevention should include risk reduction in plant location and
design and safety legislation .
Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial
facilities to be situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of
land use over time. Industry and government need to bring proper financial
support to local communities so they can provide medical and other necessary
services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of
industrial accidents.
Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in
1984. Tap water was available for only a few hours a day and was of very poor
quality. With no functioning sewage system, untreated human waste was dumped
into two nearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city had four major
hospitals but there was a shortage of physicians and hospital beds. There was
also no mass casualty emergency response system in place in the city .
Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account when
hazardous industries choose sites for manufacturing plants. Future management
of industrial development requires that appropriate resources be devoted to
advance planning before any disaster occurs .
Communities that do not possess infrastructure and technical expertise to
respond adequately to such industrial accidents should not be chosen as sites
for hazardous industry.
Since 1984
Following the events of December 3 1984 environmental
awareness and activism in India increased significantly. The Environment
Protection Act was passed in 1986, creating the Ministry of Environment and
Forests (MoEF) and strengthening India's commitment to the environment. Under
the new act, the MoEF was given overall responsibility for administering and
enforcing environmental laws and policies. It established the importance of
integrating environmental strategies into all industrial development plans for
the country. However, despite greater government commitment to protect public
health, forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing the country's
economy have taken precedence in the last 20 years .
India has undergone tremendous economic growth in the
two decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
has increased from $1,000 in 1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues to grow at
a rate of over 8% per year [20].
Rapid industrial development has contributed greatly to economic growth but
there has been significant cost in environmental degradation and increased
public health risks. Since abatement efforts consume a large portion of India's
GDP, MoEF faces an uphill battle as it tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing
industrial pollution.
Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle
emission laws have result from economic concerns taking precedence over
environmental protection.
With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been an
increase in small scale industries (SSIs) that are clustered about major urban
areas in India. There are generally less stringent rules for the treatment of
waste produced by SSIs due to less waste generation within each individual
industry. This has allowed SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewater into
drainage systems that flow directly into rivers. New Delhi's Yamuna River is
illustrative. Dangerously high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt,
cadmium, chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this river which is a major
supply of potable water to India's capital thus posing a potential health risk
to the people living there and areas downstream .
Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of
industrial solid and hazardous waste is also a problem throughout India. With
rapid industrialization, the generation of industrial solid and hazardous waste
has increased appreciably and the environmental impact is significant .
India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in
order to accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an increasing flow of capital.
In the process, a number of environmental regulations are being rolled back as
growing foreign investments continue to roll in. The Indian experience is
comparable to that of a number of developing countries that are experiencing
the environmental impacts of structural adjustment. Exploitation and export of
natural resources has accelerated on the subcontinent. Prohibitions against
locating industrial facilities in ecologically sensitive zones have been
eliminated while conservation zones are being stripped of their status so that
pesticide, cement and bauxite mines can be built .
Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle
emission laws are other consequences of economic concerns taking precedence
over environmental protection .
In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern India
caught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever, red-handed when they discovered a
dumpsite with toxic mercury laced waste from a thermometer factory run by the
company's Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpile of
mercury-laden glass was found in torn stacks spilling onto the ground in a scrap
metal yard located near a school. In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of
the World Trade Center was exported to India apparently without first being
tested for contamination from asbestos and heavy metals present in the twin
tower debris. Other examples of poor environmental stewardship and economic
considerations taking precedence over public health concerns abound .
The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of the
chemical industry and caused a reexamination of the necessity to produce such
potentially harmful products in the first place. However the lessons of acute
and chronic effects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors in Bhopal
has not changed agricultural practice patterns. An estimated 3 million people
per year suffer the consequences of pesticide poisoning with most exposure
occurring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported to be the cause
of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year. In the state of Kerala,
significant mortality and morbidity have been reported following exposure to
Endosulfan, a toxic pesticide whose use continued for 15 years after the events
of Bhopal .
Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developing
countries as a result of restrictions being placed on its use in developed
nations due to the well-established link between asbestos products and
respiratory diseases. India has become a major consumer, using around 100,000
tons of asbestos per year, 80% of which is imported with Canada being the
largest overseas supplier. Mining, production and use of asbestos in India is
very loosely regulated despite the health hazards. Reports have shown morbidity
and mortality from asbestos related disease will continue in India without
enforcement of a ban or significantly tighter controls .
UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopal
disaster in an effort to restructure and divest itself. By doing so, the
company avoided a hostile takeover, placed a significant portion of UCC's
assets out of legal reach of the victims and gave its shareholder and top
executives bountiful profits.
The company still operates under the ownership of Dow Chemicals and still
states on its website that the Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate
sabotage".
Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopal
disaster. The British chemical company, ICI, whose Indian subsidiary
manufactured pesticides, increased attention to health, safety and
environmental issues following the events of December 1984. The subsidiary now
spends 30–40% of their capital expenditures on environmental-related projects.
However, they still do not adhere to standards as strict as their parent
company in the UK..
The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of
Bhopal in a different way. The company attempted for a decade to export a nylon
plant from Richmond, VA to Goa, India. In its early negotiations with the
Indian government, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause in its
investment agreement that absolved it from all liabilities in case of an
accident. But the people of Goa were not willing to acquiesce while an
important ecological site was cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After
nearly a decade of protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont was forced to scuttle
plans there. Chennai was the next proposed site for the plastics plant. The
state government there made significantly greater demand on DuPont for
concessions on public health and environmental protection. Eventually, these
plans were also aborted due to what the company called "financial
concerns".
Conclusion
The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at
once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its aftermath were a warning that the path
to industrialization, for developing countries in general and India in
particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves
by the Indian government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to
offer some protection of the public's health from the harmful practices of
local and multinational heavy industry and grassroots organizations that have
also played a part in opposing rampant development. The Indian economy is
growing at a tremendous rate but at significant cost in environmental health
and public safety as large and small companies throughout the subcontinent
continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public health in the
context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless
thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been heeded.
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